A Call for more Political Scientists?

It is widely accepted that both formal and informal institutions matter in development processes and outcomes. For institutions to be effective they must complement local contexts and be designed by a mélange of local actors. When we examine how institutions are maintained, implemented and evolve, the answers point us to politics (Leftwich, 2011). Institutions are constructed to reflect the interests and ideas of actors involved in determining “the use, production and distribution of resources” (Leftwich, 2008, p. 6).

This week, I was urged to think more politically to work differently in development. It is fundamental that international actors understand the local political processes involved in building effective institutions to better align their projects and programs.

Currently, donors are paying attention to politics. Unfortunately, assumptions about how development happens remain static. Projects and programs continue to be technocratic, aimed at changing behaviors and practices deemed unfit for development. Unsworth (2009) suggests that thinking politically also requires delineating from this ethos and recognizing “unorthodox opportunities for progress” (p.884). Rather than fixing what has been inherently labeled wrong or problematic, there should be an emphasis on greater engagement with local structures.

I was challenged to identify how should organizations start thinking more politically. First, there needs to be organizational changes in overall values, attitudes and behavior (Unsworth, 2009). Rather than hire political economy analysts short term for ad-hoc responses, all staff must understand local politics and be willing to engage with local structures. Since there are many barriers to organizational overhaul, this is easier said then done. Major barriers include resistance from staff to engage in new ways of thinking and pressure from donors to deliver timely solutions to complicated issues. A solution that could address these barriers would be hiring more individuals with backgrounds in political science. Hiring more local (and external) political scientists would help organizations think more politically. They could provide nuanced recommendations that economists and technical advisors may have overlooked. Regional political scientists may have a better understanding of a country’s history, interplay of formal and informal institutions and how local businesses, trade unions, and civil society engage with development (and the government). My promotion of hiring (and using) local knowledge over solely external technical expertise would potentially assist in delivering more effective and practical projects and programs.

 

References

Leftwich, A. (2008) ‘Developmental States, Effective States and Poverty Reduction: The Primacy of Politics,’ United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva.

Leftwich, A. (2011/12) ‘Leadership and the institutions of governance: the new frontier in the politics of development’ in Jones-Parry, R. (eds.) Commonwealth Good Governance: democracy, development and public administration. Nexus, Cambridge UK, pp. 36-39.

Unsworth, S. (2009) ‘What’s politics got to do with it? Why donors find it so hard to come to terms with politics, and why this matters.’ Journal of International Development, 21: 883-894.doi: 10.1002/jid.1625

Decolonizing Development

Knowledge production is not neutral. Once we acknowledge this, it becomes easier to recognize how knowledge produces power, and how power produces knowledge. Research and policy in relation to development will continue to be static if the ‘West’ remains at the center of knowledge production.

In The Invention of Africa, Mudimbe (1988) explains how Europeans have been at the center of knowledge production about Africa. Through language and art, European representations of Africans have contributed to solidifying their inferiority. This externally derived knowledge perpetuates tropes and representations of Africa:

This has led to a “number of paradigmatic oppositions: traditional versus modern, oral versus written, agrarian versus industrialized” (Mudimbe, 1998, p. 4). Consequently, ‘development’ has frequently been regarded as “transitioning from the former…to the latter” (Ibid). In turn, external and internal forces continue to critique cultural norms and attempt to remove traditional institutions to follow western development standards.

As discussed in seminar, there have been calls to decolonize the development field to break away from eurocentricity. As Mazrui (1995), I believe this requires the collapse of colonial structures, with instability being the engine (p. 32). This ‘instability’ has manifested in various forms, which have included violent and nonviolent protests advocating for increased hiring of persons of color across all disciplines in academia and the removal of colonial symbols. Today we learned about the #RhodesMustFall Movement which encompassed these specific demands to decolonize higher education.

However, simply removing a statue, increasing diversity and including colonial histories is insufficient for decolonization. While important actions, they do not go far enough. There must be greater engagement with local forms of knowledge production. For example, in many African countries knowledge has been reproduced through proverbs, song, poems, and art. Scholar Ngugi wa ‘Thiong’o has also pushed for teaching and working in non-European languages across Africa. Incorporating these local forms should assist in dismantling the inherited colonial education system (Mbembe, 1998, p. 35).

The idea of decolonizing development also forces us in the ‘West’ to question how we obtain, substantiate and measure knowledge. And what constitutes ‘Southern’ knowledge? While there is no correct answer, I think scholars who are/were primarily based in the ‘South’ present better opportunities to engage with written material that may be less influenced and perhaps more critical of Western ideologies. This is not to discredit the works of a Mazrui, Sen, or Mbembe, but an encouragement to supplement learning about the ‘South’ with the works of a Rodney, Ake, and Maathai.

 

References

Mazrui, A. A. (1995) “The Blood of Experience: The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa.” World Policy Journal 12 (1), 28-34.

Mbembe, A. (2016) “Decolonizing the University: New Directions.” Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, 15 (1), 29-45.

Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988) The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Urban Politics

Lagos

 “Urbanization” is presently “one of the main demographic transformations in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Resnick, 2014, p. s3). With more people living in urban areas, towns and cities are growing at a much faster rate than rural areas. Consequently, urban poverty has increased which has not only generated new tensions and social movements but also tested the capacity of governments to improve “service delivery mechanisms” (Ibid, p. s4).

Our guest lecturer Nic Cheeseman presented his research on Nigeria, which focused on the use of decentralization to address urbanization in Lagos.

Since citizens in urban areas are more likely to oppose the national governing party, opposition parties usually constitute the sub-national government. The success of these governments have varied, usually depending on their ability to independently generate revenue and if the state actually relinquishes “responsibility and authority over decision making” (Ibid).

The Nigerian national governing party permitted the sub-national government to change their tax collection schemes and retain a large portion of their tax profit (Cheeseman and de Gramont, 2017). The multiplicity of opposition parties (competition) in Lagos compelled the government in power to actually improve services and convinced citizens to pay their taxes. Although there have been improvements, the governments’ desire to turn Lagos into a mega city has led to questionable decisions like the construction of Eko Atlantic City. Proposed as a solution to housing problems, the project has already led to the forced migration of citizens and environmental degradation.

Eko Atlantic City Developments

This can be contrasted with Resnick’s (2014) Ugandan case study where the state retained power in the capital city, Kampala in 2009. This allowed the central government to undermine the decision-making power of locally elected officials. Under these circumstances it becomes less likely that national governments will consider local grievances when decisions are made, and instead prioritize their interests and ideas for development.

Although decentralization failed to manifest in Uganda but appeared successful in Nigeria, it is fascinating that in both countries political elites ultimately made decisions that reflected their interests and ideas. Museveni’s (the center) obsession and desire to retain power ultimately undermined the voting power of citizens in Kampala who witnessed elected officials lose decision-making power. Meanwhile, in Lagos, the elite driven megacity aspirations primarily benefits the wealthy, and further marginalizes the urban poor.

References

Cheeseman, N. and de Gramont, D. “Managing a mega-city: learning the lessons from Lagos.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 3 (2017): 457-477.

Damiano, D. (2017) Why Eko Atlantic City is a Very Bad Idea.Available at: http://saharareporters.com/2017/12/02/why-eko-atlantic-city-very-bad-idea-david-damiano. (Accessed 26 November 2018).

Resnick D (2014) ‘Urban governance and service delivery in African cities: the role of politics and policies’ Development Policy Review 32, s1, s3-s17.

Neopatrimonialism and the politics of ethnicity

As Wai (2012) suggests, examining the causes of ‘state failure’ has dominated global political and international development discourses. This proliferated interest, he contends, is because Western actors are primarily concerned with maintaining international peace and security by reducing breeding grounds for criminal and terrorist activities (Wai, 2012, p. 29). With this said, the concept neopatrimonialism is often used to explain the political relationships in Africa. It can be defined as a form of organization where patrimonial relationships “pervade political and administrative systems that are formally constructed on rational and legal lines” (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 565). Political power and authority is sustained through patron-client networks. Neopatrimonial discourses have tended to suggest that this system is authentically African and can explain most African socio-political problems like corruption, institutional decay, stagnant economic growth, armed conflict and state failure.

However, as we learned today, characteristics of neopatrimonialism commonly manifest in different continents and not all countries that exhibit neopatrimonialism result in state failure. This fact forces us to examine how useful the concept is and highlights the importance of taking into account a country’s historical reality.

I believe that when neopatrimonialism is used to analyze the interplay of informal and formal institutions in governance it still holds very useful. The problem is development practitioners have often given more credence to formal institutions, associating informal ones with bad development outcomes (Unsworth cited in Carter, 2014). As scholars have already began to emphasize, rather than giving formal institutions priority over informal ones, it is fundamentally important to recognize that most countries use a combination of both to maintain political power and manage the state. Depending on the historical reality, informal social norms may play a bigger role than formal ones.

Kenya Ethnic Divisions

In this regard ethnic diversity is not simply a catalyst for violence but used by politicians to sustain political power. As with other forms of identity (gender, race, religion), ethnicity is politicized by political elites to garner a loyal base of supporters. As Klein (2018) states “different identities are activated at different times and in different ways.” When seen this way it eliminates the notion that ethnic diversity plagues development outcomes in Kenya but forces us to analyze how political elites manipulate ethnicity in both informal and formal institutions to sustain power (Kabiri, 2014).

References

Carter, B. (2014) Defining Institutions. Available at: http://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/inclusive-institutions/concepts-and-debates/defining-institutions/(Accessed: November 16 2018).

Kabiri, N. (2014) Ethnic diversity and development in Kenya: limitations of ethnicity as a category of analysis,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 52 (4): 513-534. doi: 10.1080/14662043.2014.957500.

Klein, E. (2018) How identity politics elected Donald Trump. Available at: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/5/18052390/trump-2018-2016-identity-politics-democrats-immigration-race(Accessed: November 17 2018).

Mkandawire, T. (2015). “Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections,” World Politics, 67 (3): 563-612.

Wai, Z. (2012). “Neo-patrimonialism and the Discourse of State Failure in Africa”, Review of African Political Economy, 39 (131): 27-43.

The Unintended Consequences of Intervention

Guest lecturer Nicholas Lemay-Hebert highlighted the main forms of intervention: humanitarian assistance, relief and development assistance. By analyzing the 2010 Earthquake that wreaked havoc in Haiti, he also introduced us to the unintended consequences of interventions.

I believe the presentation could have been supplemented with more information on the historical and economic background of Haiti to better understand the country’s cyclical dependence on the international community to provide services. Since Haiti gained independence from France, its economy has been in disarray due to mismanagement, corruption, debt, poverty and poor infrastructure. For this reason, it becomes less surprising that before the earthquake, international aid accounted for over half of the Haiti’s GDP (Lemay-Hebert et al., 2018, p. 19). Many international organizations already worked in the country providing health care services to Haitians. Compared to other countries in the Caribbean who are equally prone to natural disasters (Henley, 2010), Haiti was ill equipped to handle the earthquake and its aftermath. Therefore the earthquake did not dismantle existing structures in place for disaster relief, but exacerbated underlying problems.

Although all phases of intervention should attempt to address underlying socioeconomic problems, Lemay-Hebert explains that as in most places, the intervention cycle in Haiti comprised of primarily humanitarian assistance and recovery efforts. With this said, although external actors have helped save lives and provide essential services, there have been unintended consequences. Free services prior to and after the earthquake have negatively impacted local health structures, allowing the Haitian government to be held unaccountable to its citizens. Furthermore, Haitian health care workers have been exiting the national workforce to work for external NGOs that provide hire wages.

MSF in Haiti: Cholera Treatment Centre

I think it is problematic that organizations like MSF have been in Haiti since the early 1990s. There has been little to no progress in building sustainable health care services less dependent on foreign assistance. Organizations need to restructure their programs and services to include improving public health (i.e. maternal survival, family planning and life expectancy) and less focused on “narrow disease specific problems” (Garrett, 2007, p.1). Although MSF does include services to improve public health, the organization must create and follow an exit strategy. There must be greater engagement with local actors for a more collaborative approach.

Specifically within the Haitian context, there also needs to be more public-private partnerships  (like the Hôpital Universitaire de Mirebalaiscreated by Paul Farmer) to build better health infrastructure in rural areas.

References

Garrett, L. (2007) “The Challenge of Global Health”, Foreign Affairs, 86 (1): 14-38.

Henley, J. (2010)Haiti: a long descent to hell. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/14/haiti-history-earthquake-disaster. (Accessed: 9 December 2018).

Lemay-Hebert, N., Martel, A. and Robitaille, P. (2018). “Haiti: tensions between aid relief and development in the health sector” Humanitarian Alternatives 8: 18-37.

Elections and Service Delivery

Observers of 2018 Zimbabwe Elections

Recent democratic elections in the United States (2016), Zimbabwe (2018) and Myanmar (2015), have urged me to question the effectiveness of elections. Do elections actually lead to greater accountability? Do they lead to improvements in the quality of government and provision of public services?

Nic Cheeseman offered us his insights on elections and service delivery. I was introduced to the term ‘electoral fallacy’ which was first coined by Larry Diamond in 1996. It is inadequate to call countries democratic just because elections are held. The increase in multiparty elections globally has not translated to an increase in the quality of democracy.

As we have seen in Zimbabwe and Cameroon (2018), international observers often concentrate on whether elections were held in peaceful and non-violent settings, overlooking whether key ingredients for democracy were missing. This could include unbiased electoral commissions, freedom of the press, factual information, independent police, and election finance. Therefore, Lindberg’s suggestion that “repeated holdings of elections, even when not fully free and fair”…promotes “the institutionalization of democratic norms and values” (as cited in Cheeseman, 2015, p. 173) should be debunked. Without these key ingredients, elections alone aren’t able to facilitate democratization. Even when these ingredients do exist, gerrymandering, vote buying, and voter suppression is common, which suggests that elections alone also do not promote accountability.

As echoed in a previous blog, identity continues to be politicized to maintain a large enough supportive base. The US presents an interesting case where identity politics have always influenced voting patterns. The recent election of Donald Trump has led some critics to claim that the basic tenets of American democracy have been undermined (Edsall, 2017). I would refute this assertion by arguing that ‘American democracy’ has been flawed for some time. In the era of mass media, ‘fake news’ and media suppression (i.e. CNN firing of Marc Lamont Hill) have become a major concern and influence on elections. Furthermore, gerrymandering, voter suppression (i.e. 2018 mid-term elections), and clientelism have been staples of American democracy. The election of Trump should not be seen as the ‘beginning of the end’ but as an event that has put to the forefront the looming concerns for American democracy.

References

Cheeseman, N. (2015)  “The Democratic Dividend” in Democracy in Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 171-202.

Edsall, T.B. (2017) The Self-Destruction of American Democracy.Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/opinion/trump-putin-destruction-democracy.html. (Accessed: 9 December 2018).

Social Movements and the Arab Spring

In the last decade, cyber activism has managed to extend the support of many social movements. As a new tool of protest, it is easier to distribute information, facilitate organization and mobilize efficiently. Within this context, exploring social and religious movements have garnered a lot of attention, especially following the Arab Spring.

Dr. Jessica Northey challenged us to identify why and how people mobilize, introduced us to social movement theory and discussed the Arab Spring uprisings.

Social movement theories are still helpful to explain why people mobilize. Irrespective of the demands, social movements usually advocate for certain rights and economic justice. People mobilize when they collectively share the same outrage and have the similar beliefs. I think the idea that there needs to be a political opportunity or financial capability to mobilize is not helpful to explain social movements. This fails to consider how people with no resources can mobilize or how social movements have transpired under relatively stable political conditions.

It was surprising to read how people like Timur Kuran suggested “revolutions come as a surprise since the dissenting population do not reveal their discontent” (as cited in Bayat, 2013, p. 588). As Bayat (2013) points out, the Arab revolts were unsurprising to those living in the countries affected. In Tunisia specifically, many urban elites felt marginalized, suppression of political and civil freedoms, economic hardship and high youth unemployment existed (Honwana, 2013, p. 48). A salient feature of Middle Eastern public culture, many people also publicly complained about their grievances (Bayat, 2013, p. 589). In what was a departure from street-only politics, people also turned to Internet forums, blogs, Facebook pages and twitter feeds (Honwana, 2013). Another interesting feature was the use of hip-hop. Tunisian rapper Hamada Ben Amor released Rais Lebled in December 2010, which became known as the anthem of the Arab Spring. Amor had actually been making political rap songs since 2009 underground. If more people had paid attention to cyber activism, the Arab Spring may have been less of a ‘surprise.’

It was interesting to learn that despite the uprisings’ non-religious nature, Islamic parties primarily assumed political power. However, some like Bayat (2013) believe they represent Post-Islamism, which aims to “mix religiosity and rights, and faith and freedom”(p. 592). While this is progress, not many reforms have ensued since the Arab Spring. Taub (2016) urges us to recognize how the replacement of political leaders has not strengthened institutions. For this reason, I will not be surprised if another ‘Arab Spring’ reemerges in the coming years.

References

Bayat, A. (2013) “The Arab Spring and Its Surprises,” Development and Change 44 (2): 587-601.

Honwana, A. (2013) Youth and Revolution in Tunisia. London: Zed Books.

Taub, A. (2016) The Unsexy Truth about why the Arab Spring Failed.Available at: https://www.vox.com/2016/1/27/10845114/arab-spring-failure(Accessed 10 December 2018).

The Challenge of Supporting Democratization

Today, Susan Dodsworth highlighted the complexities of democratic assistance and its critiques. Presently, nearly every Western government gives democratic assistance (Carothers 2015). As Dodsworth explained, the primary goal is to strengthen democratic institutions and spread democratic values.

Although donors may prioritize different sectors, the wide scope of democratic assistance surprised me. I was intrigued by the financial support given to media and the free flow of information. With social media making it easier to disseminate fake news, it was good to learn about organizations like ‘StopFake’ who aim to stop its’ spread. This progress in addressing contemporary issues highlights one of strengths of democratic assistance.

The challenges and critiques of democratic assistance are emblematic of overarching criticisms of foreign aid. Despite expressing a need to think more politically, donors keep attempting to “export Western institutional models” rather than comprehending local contexts (Ibid, p. 61). Western donor’s selective nature of deciding where to promote democracy has also resulted in some countries facing less pressure to adopt democratic reforms or respect human rights.

Indonesian activists protest against Myanmar in Surabaya, Indonesia

It was helpful to evaluate the DFID programme for democratic change in Myanmar to understand the shortcomings of democratic assistance. Due Myanmar’s stagnant democratic transition and treatment of Rohingya people, it is clear that the programme has not achieved its goal of creating “stronger state-society relations, or inclusive policies that benefit poor and marginalized people.”Hung (2017) presents a convincing argument, suggesting, “that the 2015 general election was not precursor for democracy” but highlighted the constitutional requirement of elected party’s to share governing responsibilities with the military (p.25). Although DIFD was aware of this and the marginalization of Rohingya people, they failed to engage with local agents who sought to dismantle the repressive structures.

In some situations it is tricky for donors to work with local activists or opposition groups because national governments may introduce repressive laws or even expel external actors. I suspect that in Myanmar this would have happened. This is one of the major challenges of democratic assistance, which has led me to think of solutions.

First and foremost, democracy is internal and has to come from below; if there is no demand for democracy it is becomes difficult to promote. I believe this is a pragmatic and realistic viewpoint. I am not promoting that we ignore human rights violations, but am advocating for different approaches to democracy promotion. I was pleased to read that the EU and US have issued economic sanctions against Myanmar. As for apartheid South Africa, I believe these measures from above, along with pressure from below will lead to greater democratic practices.

References

Carothers, T. (2015) Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose. Journal of Democracy. 26(1): 59–73.

DIFD (September 2014) Business Case and Intervention Summary: Programme for Democratic Change in Burma. Available at:http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/4434197.odtorvia Documents tab here: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203454(Accessed 20 November 2018).

Huang, R.L. (2017) Myanmar’s Way to Democracy and the Limits of the 2015 Elections.  Asian Journal of Political Science 25 (1): 25-44. doi: 10.1080/02185377.2016.1245154.